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The point being that for the most part, when a judge makes ra­
cially insensitive comments, tells a racial joke, shares a racial email, 
or states a policy position that negatively implicates race, they should 
recuse themselves from cases where race can be implicated. It is not 
that they are racists, per se, but rather that they are likely to be influ­
enced by automatic racial attitudes that they hold, or at the very least, 
give the impression that they cannot be impartial decision makers. I'll 
end on that note. 
REMARKS OF DMITRY BAM 
I usually tell my students not to try to make two big points in five 
minutes, but they're not here, so I'm going to try to make two big 
points. The first point I want to make is-and this really builds off 
what Greg and Debra said-is that we're all biased. We all have bi­
ases. If legal realism has taught us anything, it's that. The way we 
perceive the world depends in large part on our family, our exper­
iences, our race, and our gender, on what we believe when we encoun­
ter new information.63 And as somebody who writes about judicial 
elections, I'm going to focus mostly on elected judges, but I'll talk 
about other kinds of biases that are out there. 
We've talked a lot about money today, and money is an easy 
target. It's an easy target because it's quantifiable; it's easier to find a 
solution when it comes to money, you can try to draw bright-line rules 
about recusal depending on how much money you receive in a cam­
paign or how much money is spent on you. But money is just one 
problem. I want to argue that there are at least two other problems. 
One is at least as important, as big as money, and the other is much 
bigger. 
The former is the problem of judges promising, committing 
themselves, to certain positions in the course of their campaigns. This 
was the issue in the Republican Party of Minnesota v. White case, 
when I was a law student in 2002, where the court said judges have 
the right to announce their views, perhaps even promising to make 
certain holdings.64 Clearly there's not much of a difference between 
saying, my view is that abortion is illegal under state law and I'm 
going to do everything I can to stop it, versus actually promising to 
stop abortion. Right? So judges, oftentimes if you look at current cam­
paigns, they make announcements, expose their views, make commit­
63. See generally, e.g., CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHIS1UNG VIVALDI: How STEREO­
TYPES AFFECT Us AND WHAT WE CAN Do (2010) (addressing the role of stereotypes 
in concepts of social identity). 
64. 536 U.S. 765, 787-88 (2002). 
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ments to rule a certain way,65 and once you've made those promises, 
you better be careful about keeping them, because the voters are going 
to hold you accountable next time. So that's one big problem. 
The other, the biggest problem, really, is the fact that judges fac­
ing election have to keep the electorate happy to keep their jobs. We 
have lots of studies these days-for a long time we speculated that 
judges might be biased in these cases, biased in favor of in-state inter­
ests, biased in favor of the political party that's in power at the time 
the election is coming up-and now we have the numbers to back it 
up.66 I feel like every month there's a new study showing judges are 
biased in favor of in-state parties;67 and as Chief Justice Cobb men­
tioned last panel, judges impose harsher sentences as elections get 
nearer-they impose more death penalties.68 So now we have those 
numbers, and so we know that judges are biased. Those are big, im­
portant biases that we haven't talked much about, that I think are just 
as important as money. 
Of course, elected judges are subject to the same biases-all of 
the other biases-that every judge is subject to. And don't forget, in 
Caperton we had two other recusals, which we touched on earlier.69 
One was based on friendship; if I had PowerPoint, you would see a 
justice on the state supreme court on the Riviera with one of the par­
ties to the case. Justice Maynard eventually recused.70 But that's a big 
issue, and that's a harder one to regulate. We saw something similar at 
the U.S. Supreme Court, with Justice Scalia and Dick Cheney going 
duck hunting together.71 How do you address that, those kinds of bi­
ases? So those are other, additional biases. 
Of course personal characteristics matter as well. That's the other 
big piece. In one of my favorite recent studies, a couple of Harvard 
65. In fact, special-interest groups often send questionnaires to judicial candidates 
asking them to express their views on controversial issues. See, e.g., Rebecca Mae 
Salokar, Endorsements in Judicial Campaigns: The Ethics of Messaging, 28 JusT. 
Svs. J. 342, 347-48 (describing questionnaires special-interest groups use in the en­
dorsement process). 
66. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' 
Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 172 (2009). 
67. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, ls the International 
Court ofJustice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 601 (2005) ("We use more sophisti­
cated empirical tests, as well as more data, to show that, in fact, judges are signifi­
cantly biased in favor of their home states when that state appears as a party."). 
68. See supra pp. 579-80. 
69. See supra p. 490. 
70. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 874 (2009). 
71. See, e.g., Steve Twomey, Scalia Angrily Defends His Duck Hunt with Cheney, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/l8/politics/l8CND­
SCAL.html. 
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professors looked at judges with daughters, and how they decide cases 
involving women's rights.72 If you have a daughter or two daughters, 
you decide sexual harassment cases differently, sexual discrimination 
cases differently.73 "What you had for breakfast" might sound silly, 
but there have been studies looking at Israeli judges where they im­
pose less punitive sentences immediately after lunch.74 So all those 
things make a difference. We had an empathy debate with Justice 
Sotomayor' s appointment, when President Obama said empathy is an 
important piece of a Justice's character, and Senator Sessions got up 
on the floor and said, look, empathy's just a code word, it's about bias, 
right? You want a judge who is biased. 75 So there are all of these 
biases out there, and they're very hard to identify. 
I want to finish with what might be a pessimistic note. Keith 
Swisher opened today, he was the optimist;76 I'm going to take apes­
simistic note. I don't think recusal is the answer. I don't think recusal 
can solve the judicial-bias problem. We know these biases are out 
there, and recusal is tempting as a solution, in part because there's 
seemingly no other solution, and in part because it seems so perfect at 
the time. You have a biased judge? Well you can just get rid of that 
biased judge, that's the fix. And I want to suggest that this doesn't 
work for at least a couple of reasons. 
One reason is one that others have already talked about, and eve­
ryone seems to agree on, which is that judges decide their own recusal 
motions.77 I think this could be easily changed. I actually wrote an 
article recently that that procedure is unconstitutional, not just prob­
lematic, because it puts the judge in the position of deciding their own 
case.78 If you're a lawyer you can make that argument, to be rejected 
by the court, I'm sure. But even if you have other judges making these 
decisions, judges like each other, and they don't like recusal.79 Law­
72. See Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having 
Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?, 59 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 37 (2015). 
73. Id. at 45-47. 
74. Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. 
NAT'L AcAD. SCI. 6889, 6889 (2011), http://www.pnas.org/contentl108/17/6889. 
75. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. 7-8 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, 
Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary). 
76. See supra pp. 484-89. 
77. See supra pp. 500-03. 
78. See Dmitry Barn, Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, 84 Miss. L.J. 1135 
(2015). 
79. See, e.g., In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Judges asked to 
recuse themselves hesitate to impugn their own standards; judges sitting in review of 
others do not like to cast aspersions."). 
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yers hesitate to bring these motions.80 It's almost impossible to create 
a true adversarial process. We think of recusal as any other motion, 
where you have two litigants getting together and filing a motion with 
a judge, but that's not what recusal is. Recusal is a dispute between a 
judge and a litigant. So even if you bring it to another judge to decide 
that dispute, it's almost impossible to create an adversarial process. 
And maybe we don't even want to create an adversarial process, 
where the litigant and the judge square off to decide whether or not 
that judge should be recused. 
And the final piece here, really the biggest one here, is if bias is 
institutional, in the sense that elected judges are biased-and the num­
bers seem to back this up, of course not every judge in every case, but 
statistically significant-then every elected judge is biased, so recusal 
just can't fix that problem. You can't replace one elected judge with 
another elected judge when both of them have to face the electorate, 
which is going to be concerned about and focus on how that judge 
decided each criminal case, and the judge will have to worry about 
how a criminal case has been spun against them. These campaigns are 
typically about who is the toughest on crime.81 So if you're a judge, 
you've got to be careful about those consequences.82 So that's why I 
think recusal doesn't work, and also why I think it's inconsistent with 
the idea of elections. Think about an election. It's about giving the 
people a chance to decide-a sort of popular sovereignty, democratic 
values-decide which values they prefer. It seems odd to remove the 
judge who has made certain promises or commitments from being 
able to exercise those promises and commitments. 
So there are lots of problems here. I don't have a great answer, 
unfortunately, but I don't think recusal is the answer at all to fix this 
massive bias problem. I say in my articles that I think it's the biggest 
problem facing law, really all of law. My colleagues always say, yeah 
you're just saying that to appeal to 2L law review editors to accept 
your articles, but no, that's not the case. It really is, I think, the biggest 
80. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and 
the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 641 (2002) (discussing 
concerns that lawyers have about bringing recusal motions in front of judges who will 
ultimately decide those motions). 
81. See, e.g, Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: "Tough on Crime," Soft on 
Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 328 (2010) (describing 
"tough on crime" boasts in judicial election campaigns). 
82. See, e.g., A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Message to Bench, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/1 J/04/us/politics/04judges 
.html?_r=O (describing the successful campaign to remove three justices on the Iowa 
Supreme Court following a unanimous decision legalizing same-sex marriage). 
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problem facing law. In ninety to ninety-five percent of all cases, all 
judging is done by state judges, and about ninety percent of those are 
elected judges, so that's a lot of our legal work.83 And these are not 
driver's-licenses cases or bureaucratic cases, these are fundamental­
rights cases that decide questions on U.S. constitutional rights, on vot­
ing rights, abortion law, same-sex marriage-these are key, funda­
mental cases being decided by potentially biased judges. 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
Questions from Jed Shugerman to the Panelists 
Jed Shugerman: 
Great, there's a lot on the table. I want to make sure we have 
plenty of time for discussion, but I wanted to start with a couple of 
questions to focus on. Dmitry ended with the problems, without neces­
sarily pinpointing solutions, but given that we've had several panelists 
focus on the problems of implicit bias, I want to give just a couple 
notes. Remember the doll study that was the focus of Brown v. Board 
of Education?84 It wasn't the most advanced social science-it was 
early social science when it came to race and implicit associations. Dr. 
Kenneth Clark gave white children and black children in the south 
white and black dolls and asked for associations with those two dolls, 
and found that both black and white children in Jim Crow South had 
negative associations with the black doll and positive associations 
with the white doll. 85 And it turns out that those numbers were worse 
in northern states than in southern states.86 And here's another fun 
fact: the study was replicated recently, and those numbers are even 
83. See, e.g., Shugerman, Economic Crisis, supra note 6, at 1063 ("Almost ninety 
percent of state judges today face some kind of popular election."). 
84. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). Dr. Kenneth Clark testified about the "doll test" 
in Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), one of the cases consolidated into Brown. 
See ANGELO N. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE 
LAW 53 (2006). 
85. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JusncE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 321 (2011) (describing 
Dr. Clark's testimony about the doll test). 
86. See id.; see also JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
SHOULD HAVE SAID 51 (2002); Chris Edelson, Judging in a Vacuum, or, Once More, 
Without Feeling: How Justice Scalia's Jurisprudential Approach Repeats Errors 
Made in Plessy v. Ferguson, 45 AKRON L. REv. 513, 542 (2011); Note, Grade School 
Segregation: The latest Attack on Racial Discrimination, 61 YALE L.J. 730, 737 
(1952). 
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worse today, in 2014.87 And one more note about that: we've had 
some reference to Mahzarin Banaji's study,88 and the papers about 
implicit bias. I actually have given my students access to that study 
and asked them to look at it, and think about bias, all kinds of bias, 
when I teach tort law. So given that lay of the land now, where we're 
more aware of implicit bias at least as decision-makers, what are the 
solutions? Debra, in your writing you talked about education, trying to 
use those resources. 89 Here we've been talking about recusal, is that a 
solution? Is better judicial selection a solution, and maybe more elec­
tions, not fewer? Maybe more accountability to the people, so that 
people who are held over from an earlier era and are not moving into 
the twenty-first century can be voted out of office? What do you think 
about those solutions to implicit racial and gender bias? 
Rex R. Perschbacher: 
I have a couple responses. One, remember there's also a part of (I 
think) the ABA's Section on Litigation study asking judges whether 
they were above average or not at detecting and deflecting bias, and 
ninety percent of the judges found that they were above average.90 
This is not a criticism of judges, this is us, this is human beings, this is 
the way in which we think about the world. Now I think recusal is not 
the answer, but I don't think there's any better answer. That can be 
my non-answer answer. I think that there's some virtue in adopting 
regimes where there's more-or-less automatic recusal-Chief Judge 
Lippman was talking about that in New York, where if you're given a 
certain amount of money you're not going to hear the case, that's 
that.91 Because that would over time, I would hope, desensitize the 
judges to recusal; as a judge, I would see that I'm not being accused 
directly, I'm just following the law, this is what I have to do, I'm out 
of here. I think those sorts of approaches that are more peremptory­
Califomia of course uses a peremptory challenge for trial judges92­
those kinds of things would help. 
87. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Blackthink's Acting White Stigma in Education 
and How It Fosters Academic Paralysis in Black Youth, 50 How. L.J. 711, 749 n.14 
(2006) (citing GIRL LIKE ME (Reel Works Teen Filmmaking 2005)). 
88. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 17. 
89. See supra pp. 591-94. 
90. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1225-26, 1226 n.127. 
91. See supra pp. 552-56. 
92. CAL. Civ. PROC. CooE §§ 170-170.9 (West 2015). 
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Dmitry Barn: 
But of course the peremptory piece doesn't work when it's im­
plicit bias. We don't know our implicit bias ourselves, it's subcon­
scious. The best answer I can think of is to try to look for evidence of 
actual bias. Maybe that's educating the public-one of the articles I 
wrote is about giving the public more information on the ballot it­
self93-so having more neutral evaluations about judges, and if you 
find evidence of a judge's bias that is not just subconscious bias that 
isn't acted upon, but rather if there is bias that a judge acts upon, 
somebody should be there to stop it. Who that somebody is, I think, 
has to be the people. They're the ones that are in charge here. A piece 
I'm working on right now is about the jury as a check on judicial bias 
and having more active roles for the jury, but those are the only possi­
ble solutions I can think of. Actually, we talked a lot about appear­
ances, but here I think there's not much we can do with appearances­
here, we have to actually find evidence that some judges are acting in 
a biased way, whether or not they have the implicit bias, in order to 
have somebody step in and try to stop them. 
Debra Lyn Bassett: 
One of the benefits of the research being done into the Implicit 
Association Test and unconscious bias is the idea that, by virtue of 
making people aware of the fact that they have these implicit biases, 
the educational component can help reduce bias.94 At this point what 
they've developed so far has caused a temporary reduction, but at least 
there has been a reduction in unconscious bias moving forward. The 
hope is that as we get more and more psychological testing done, the 
reduction will increase-they've been able to now extend what started 
out as being a reduction lasting twenty-four hours to at least months,95 
93. See Dmitry Barn, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY. L.J. 553 
(2013). 
94. See Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial 
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 1006, 1020-22 
(2007); Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1223. 
95. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of 
Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and 
Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 800, 801, 807 (2001) (not­
ing that in a study that "sought to test whether automatic negative attitudes can be 
temporarily modified," participants achieved a temporary modification of racial bias 
lasting twenty-four hours); Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping): 
Effects of Training in the Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype Activa­
tion, 78 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 871, 879 (2000) (measuring this effect 
over a twenty-four-hour time frame); Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 
27, at 411-13, 415, 417-18 (emphasizing the temporary nature of reductions in im-
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and so hopefully over time they'd be able to come up with something 
that would help reduce it altogether. But I think the educational com­
ponent is absolutely crucial, because absent that awareness of the po­
tential for unconscious bias, I think people are all too comfortable 
floating along thinking, "Who, me? I'm not biased. I can approach this 
case objectively." Think how often litigators use that in the juror con­
text-you know, a juror who has said something and then the lawyer 
decides to try to rehabilitate them by saying, "But you can be fair, 
right?" "Oh yes, I can be fair." So, I think having the educational 
component as at least one piece in the arsenal helps. And I agree that 
judicial recusal or disqualification is not an absolutely perfect ap­
proach, but I'd sure hate to think of where we would be without it. 
Without it, would we really always have to come up with some sort of 
concrete proof of actual bias? I don't think we'd be comfortable with 
that either. 
Gregory S. Parks: 
I sort of agree with those arguments. I know the literature, and 
yes, you can reduce an individual's implicit biases by various meth­
ods, but the individual has to be motivated to want their biases re­
duced. So a judge that isn't interested in going to any training because 
they seriously don't believe that they're biased, or they believe that 
these are philosophical views that they have and it's not racial bias or 
gender bias or bias against LBGT individuals, creates a conundrum. 
I think that diversification of the bench is a good thing. It can 
create some challenges in an elected judiciary. But there is a theory 
called social tuning, which is sort of two theories: one theory is that 
people aggregate to the middle, so if you have different ideas in the 
mix, then individuals might not be so extreme.96 The other is that, at 
plicit bias achieved in psychological studies); Laurie A. Rudman et al., "Unlearning" 
Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PER· 
sONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 856, 860 (2001) (decreased unconscious bias and stere­
otyping over a fourteen-week session); see also Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining 
Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 
81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 828, 838 (2001) (stating that their "current data 
cannot address the long-term consequences" of their counterstereotypic mental 
imagery). 
96. Myriam N. Bechtoldt et al., Motivated Information Processing, Social Tuning, 
and Group Creativity, 99 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 622 (2010); Jeffrey R. 
Huntsinger & Stacey Sinclair, When It Feels Right, Go with It: Affective Regulation of 
Affiliative Social Tuning, 28 Soc. COGNITION 290, 291 (2010); Garriy Shteynberg, A 
Silent Emergence of Culture: The Social Tuning Effect, 99 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PsYCHOL. 683, 687 (20 l O); Lian Shufang, A Study ofSocial Tuning Effect on Implicit 
Stereotype, 27 PsYCHOL. SCI. 1046 (2004); Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of 
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least when it comes to race, individuals-for example, whites who 
have black friends, having a black friend does help reduce your bias, 
because you get to see a black person as a person, and not someone on 
TV, or in passing on the street.97 
I do like the idea of recusal. With implicit bias the challenge is 
that there's not enough research to show how it plays out in various 
forms of behavior. But there is some research. So when we have a 
judge who makes racially insensitive comments, you can probably tie 
that to implicit racial bias at the very least, even if the judge denies 
that they're racist.98 So if I can, I want to read something. February 
20, 2012: Richard Cebull, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Montana, forwarded a racially charged email about 
President Obama from his official courthouse email address. The sub­
ject line of the email read "A Mom's Memory." It contained the fol­
lowing text: 
Normally I don't send or forward a lot of these, but even by my 
standards, it was a bit touching. I want all of my friends to feel 
what I felt when I read this. Hope it touches your heart, like it did 
mine. A little boy said to his mother, "Mommy, how come I'm 
black and you're white?" His mother replied, "Don't even go there, 
Barack. From what I can remember about the party, you're lucky 
you don't bark."99 
Now it's an interesting play on miscegenation, a white woman 
and a dog, but the usual play here is actually what you saw a lot in the 
election, and post-election, and post-second election, associating the 
president with various forms of non-human primates. 100 
Automatic Racial Attitudes: The Role ofAffiliative Motivation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PsYCHOL. 583, 584 (2005); Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of the Self: 
Consequences for the Self-Evaluations of Stereotype Targets, 89 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PsYCHOL. 160, 161 (2005). 
97. Christopher L. Aberson et al., Implicit Bias and Contact: The Role of Inter­
ethnic Friendships, 144 J. Soc. PsYCHOL. 335 (2004); Tiffany Brannon & Gregory M. 
Walton, Enacting Cultural Interests: How Intergroup Contact Reduces Prejudice by 
Sparking Interest in an Out-Group's Culture, 24 PsYCHOL. Set. 1947 (2013); Heidi 
Elizabeth McGlothlin, Children's Decision-Making About Social Relationships: The 
Impact of Similarity, Racial Attitudes, and Intergroup Contact (2004) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park), http://drum.lib.umd.edu/ 
bitstream/handle/1903/1489/umi-umd-1441.pdf?sequence=1. 
98. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. 
99. See M.J. Lee, Judge Admits to Anti-Obama Email, POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2012, 
6: 14 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312n3486.html. 
100. See, e.g., Dan Amira, GOP Official Who E-mailed an Obama Monkey Photo 
Won't Resign, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 20, 2011, 10:10 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelli 
gencer/2011/04/gop_official_wont_resign_over.html; Catherine Taibi, Belgian News­
paper Accused of Racism for Picture of Obama and Michelle as Apes, HuFFINGTON 
PosT (Mar. 24, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/24/news 
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The challenge here was that Chief Judge Cebull's response, when 
called on the carpet, was, I received this email from my brother, it is 
indeed racist, so my brother must be racist but I'm not. I simply for­
warded the email. 101 After Chief Judge McKee in the Third Circuit 
pressured the Ninth Circuit to do a closer review of other emails sent 
by Chief Judge Cebull, it revealed that he had sent many racist, 
homophobic, and sexist emails, 102 which underscored that even if he 
wanted to believe he is not a racist, he does harbor automatic, anti­
black, maybe anti-whole-range-of-other-people attitudes. 
Now this wasn't an issue about recusal, but I sure as hell would 
hate to be a black man in front of this judge in court in any kind of 
case. Luckily, he stepped down. So pushing back a little bit on your 
contention, Dmitry, I think recusal could be useful in certain circum­
stances, though probably not as widespread as one might hope. 
Dmitry Barn: 
Let me just clarify: I love recusal. I think it works in situations 
like that, and I think it's something we shouldn't abandon. I just don't 
think it's the answer. I don't think it solves the bulk of the problem. 
When you have a judge who writes racially insensitive emails, that 
judge should be recused. In the campaign contribution context, in 
cases like Caperton, I think Justice Benjamin should have been dis­
qualified and should have recused. It's just whether or not recusal can 
really solve the bias, the core of the bias problem, and I don't think so. 
Caperton came out when I really started writing about this topic, and 
when I was in law school the White case came out, where Justice 
paper-obama-ape-belgian-satire-putin-barack-president-racism-racist_n_5020987. 
html; South Korea Compares Obama to a Monkey, N.Y. PosT (Dec. 26, 2014, 11:48 
PM), http://nypost.com/2014/ 12/26/n-korea-cal ls-obama-a-monkey-blames-us-for­
web-crash/. For a more recent example, see Univision Host Fired for Calling Obama 
an Ape, USA TooAY (Mar. 12, 2015, 3:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/ 
people/2015/03112/uni visions-rodner-figueroa-fired-for-michelle-obama-comment/ 
70220006/. 
101. See Lee, supra note 99 ("I didn't send it as racist, although that's what it is. I 
sent it out because it's anti-Obama."). 
102. See, e.g., Clair Johnson, 3rd Circuit Chief Judge Satisfied with Cebull Investi­
gation, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Jan. 29, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://billingsgazette.com/ 
newsnocal/crime-and-courts/rd-circuit-chief-judge-satisfied-with-cebull-investigationl 
article_cca958e 1-33 l6-579e-8bf6-a8 Id7d7994 I6.html; Matt Volz, Former U.S. Dis­
trict Judge Richard Cebull Sent Hundreds of Bigoted Emails Throughout Tenure, 
HuFFINGTON PosT (Jan. 18, 2014, 10:39 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/ 
01/18/richard-cebull_n_ 4623151.html; Annie Youderian, Judge Probe Reveals More 
Inappropriate Emails, CouRrnousE NEWS SERV. (Jan. 19, 2014, 10:22 PM), http:// 
www .courthousenews.com/2014/0 l /19/64654.htm. 
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Kennedy said recusal can be the answer to these problems. 103 So for 
me it was love at first sight with recusal. It's just, and I've written 
papers about this, 104 I just don't think when we get to the real main 
problem-which is about elected judges thinking about their job pros­
pects, and elected judges making promises and commitments on the 
campaign trail that bias their decisions-I just don't see recusal as 
solving those problems. 
Jed Shugerman: 
Let me push on this a little bit more, because I think we want to 
distinguish between the cases of explicit racism, which happen but 
only are signifiers, or are only symbolic, of how widespread implicit 
bias is, but people aren't aware of implicit bias, so I personally found 
it eye-opening when I and my friends, both white and black, took the 
Mahzarin Banaji Implicit Association Test. You have to hit buttons­
so instead of just coming up with words loosely, they show pictures, 
faces, and then because of the faces you see and the words you see 
you have to immediately respond with hitting on the keyboard either 
the left side of the keyboard or the right side of the keyboard, and if 
you don't answer in half a second it doesn't register. 105 So it has to be 
immediate. When I took this test and others took this test, white and 
black, we were all surprised at how much we were racists. We all had 
negative associations with black faces and more positive associations 
with white faces, white or black. So it replicated the studies of the 
dolls. 106 So here are just two suggestions for the panel: one is requir­
ing all judges to take this test. The judge will say, "I'm not a racist." 
Well it turns out, you take this test and it turns out you do have these 
biases. Just to push a little further, a modest proposal: then publish the 
results of those studies. So you have an index of which judges have 
the strongest implicit biases, and then those can be the basis for 
recusal or disqualification motions. So, how about that brave new 
world? 
Debra Lyn Bassett: 
The first part is already being done. That's exactly what the ABA 
Section on Litigation and the National Center for State Courts are do­
103. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 802 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
104. See, e.g., Dmitry Barn, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appear­
ance of Bias, 2011 BYU L. REV. 943 (2011). 
105. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 17. 
106. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
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ing in their workshops and programs that they're offering for judges, 
for sitting judges. 107 They offer these workshops for implicit bias and 
part of the workshop is taking the Implicit Association Test, so they 
can see firsthand how it works, and the reaction has been overwhelm­
ingly positive. It's been sort of an "oh my goodness, I had no idea." 
And the judges have responded very favorably, and think this is very 
valuable information that they've learned. '°8 And just kind of a half­
step back, the creators of the IAT, Anthony Greenwald at the Univer­
sity of Washington and Mahzarin Banaji at Harvard, have repeatedly 
said that the result of this test does not automatically mean that you 
are a racist, it means you harbor these biases. 109 Maybe that's drawing 
a fine line, but they don't want people to have the idea that a strong 
race bias on the test automatically translates into the person being a 
racist, perhaps for obvious reasons. Because of largely vicarious ex­
periences-that's what they're seeing in culture, that's what they've 
experienced-most of us carry these more negative associations with 
respect to race and gender and age and disability. 
Rex R. Perschbacher: 
I think it is both fair and unfair to say that judges are some of the 
toughest people to be in this position. They get every day people say­
ing, "You're great, I love all of your opinions." That's just the way in 
which lawyers, in particular, tend to interact with judges. And for 
them to have to face saying, "I'm a racist, what do you mean?" is 
going to be very, very difficult. So I think judges have the hardest job 
of all in facing these situations. I'm glad Dmitry is on the side of 
recusal, at least part of the time. As I say, I think more automatic rules 
would work better, because they might eliminate some of the accusa­
tory notions that are behind all this. So instead of "You're a racist, 
you're biased," "What do you mean?" it'd be nice to have more auto­
matic rules that knock people off, and they adapt to that, and that's 
just the way it is. 
107. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 26, at 6; Drummond, supra note 26, at 20-21 
(reporting on the ABA's creation of a program addressing implicit bias in the 
judiciary). 
108. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 26, at 21 (reporting that with respect to the pilot 
judicial education programs in California, Minnesota, and North Dakota, "at least 
80% of participants who responded to assessment questions in each state expressed 
satisfaction with the implicit bias program and saw its applicability to their work," and 
noting that "[t]heir comments used adjectives such as excellent, valuable, important, 
relevant, informative, worthwhile, and eye-opening to describe their reactions to the 
programs"). 
109. See generally MAHZARIN R. BANNI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: 
HIDDEN B1AsEs OF GooD PEOPLE (2013). 
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Jed Shugerman: 
Why don't we open it up to questions? 
Question from Doug Lindner to the Panelists 
Doug Lindner: 
Thank you all for being here. My name is Doug Lindner; I'm a 
student here at the law school. My question for the whole panel is: I 
wonder if you have thoughts on whether the process of judicial selec­
tion has some effect on implicit political bias. Not just the issues of 
race, gender, et cetera, but also things like the environment of worship 
or any other issue that very politically active people may have stronger 
feelings about. 
Rex R. Perschbacher: 
Let me respond. Yes! Why does the President of the United 
States choose the people on the U.S. Supreme Court? Why does the 
governor of the State of California, second-time-around-governor, 
choose the people that he chooses for the bench? Because of the way 
they act politically, because of the steps they'll take. So I think there's 
no question that, at the higher-court levels certainly, maybe less so at 
the trial-court level, that the people chosen are chosen for deeply polit­
ical reasons and it would be shocking to find them going contrary to 
that. I think we're just addressing things that come up in the course of 
their time on the judiciary where they may have an opportunity to step 
aside. So, yes, people are chosen politically. Look, in my state, Cali­
fornia, we haven't had a direct recent history of judges being thrown 
off the bench because of their views, but we had a time in the 1970s I 
think it was, the late 1970s, when three members of the state supreme 
court were removed. 110 The first Governor Brown, in his first adminis­
tration, put them on-and maybe he was more careless then-he put 
them on the court, they voted against the death penalty every single 
time, and they were pushed off the court through a retention election 
in which they were not retained. The people who were voting knew 
what they were going to get because the new governor, Deukmejian, 
I I 0. The removal of three justices from the Supreme Court of California occurred in 
a 1986 retention election. See G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection ofState Supreme 
Court Justices, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2003); John T. Wold & John H. 
Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the 
Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JuDJCATURE 348, 348-49 (1986). 
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was very harsh on law-and-order issues. 111 The people who sponsored 
the campaign were largely business groups who wanted a change in 
the law of another sort. 112 I don't think there's any magical solution in 
the appointment process or the response process that'll fix these 
things. 
Dmitry Barn: 
We had a similar situation in Iowa, just a couple of years ago, 
where there were justices who voted in favor of same-sex marriage 
and got voted out of office in a retention election, which used to be 
completely safe. 113 So, undoubtedly, judges have to be conscious of 
what's going to get them elected, what's going to keep their jobs. I 
think the problem is even worse at the trial level where you know as a 
trial judge that each one of your decisions could be used against you in 
the next election, and that could drive the electorate against you. So 
that's why they are really cautious in cases that have high ceilings, 
which are usually criminal cases. You have to be cautious about how 
you sentence people, because if somebody gets out of prison and com­
mits another crime, that's going to be what the next campaign is all 
about. 
Jed Shugerman: 
But judicial elections can be a red herring here. So let me take 
each of those examples and add another one. So in the example of 
111. See William Blum, Day of the Locust, 75 A.B.A. J. 108, 108 (1989) (reviewing 
JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME 
CouRT JUSTICE (1989)) (noting that at the time of the retention election, former Gov­
ernor Brown "was on his way out, to be replaced by the staunchly conservative 
George Deukmejian, the former state attorney general ... [who] had climbed on the 
law-and-order bandwagon"). 
112. See id. (stating that the opposition to the California justices was funded by 
"sizeable contributions from oil and gas interests, insurance companies, and real-es­
tate and agricultural associations"); Frank Clifford, Financial Impact on Campaign: 
Stands on Civil Cases Stir Praise, Criticism of Bird, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 1986), http:// 
articles.Iatimes.com/l 986-03-09/news/mn-17892_I_bird (noting that "business inter­
ests have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to defeat [the California justices]" 
and citing accusations that the justices were "anti-business" and "anti-insurance"); 
Tom Wicker, Opinion, Jn the Nation; A Naked Power Grab, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 
1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/l 4/opinion/in-the-nation-a-naked-power­
grab.html (noting that "a deeper motive of the business groups involved in the anti­
Bird campaign-big contributors include the Independent Oil Producers Agency and 
the Western Growers Association-was suggested when Crime Victims for Court Re­
form issued a paper charging the Bird court with being 'anti-business'"). 
113. See Sharyn Jackson, Iowa Gay Marriage Ruling a Turning Point for Justices, 
USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2014, 11:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2014/04/02/iowa-gay-marriage-ruling-a-turning-point-for-justices/7237453/. 
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Rose Bird in California, if she were up for reappointment by 
Deukmejian, he would have never reappointed her. You take the Iowa 
judges with Governor Branstad, who helped orchestrate the anti-gay 
marriage campaign 114-he would have never reappointed those three 
Iowa judges either. And Penny White, who has been a strong voice for 
reform, was a Democrat who was largely pro-death penalty on the 
Tennessee Supreme Court. She voted in one case, where there was a 
pretty strong procedural argument, to vacate a death sentence but still 
keep the killer in jail for the rest of his life. 115 That one case she was a 
concurring opinion on, and she was tossed off the bench. 116 The gov­
ernor at the time, Sundquist, said she should have known better, 117 and 
no doubt, if it was up to the governor, she would not have been reap­
pointed, and the legislature-they also would like to be governor one 
day-they would have cracked down on those three judges even 
harder. 
So again, I think elections are messy for a bunch of unique rea­
sons, like with money being so direct. But the politics are still behind 
the scenes in appointments. The money is still behind the scenes. In 
some ways it's scarier with appointments because of how the special 
interests are less transparent-there's less disclosure. Basically the 
governor and the legislature are organized political action committees, 
or the donor committees, because the judge doesn't get the money, but 
they know the governor and the legislature would be and they're going 
to be picking them and not picking them. So there isn't the same op­
portunity for disclosure. So in some way I think the election-versus­
appointment debate obscures these other problems. Again, length of 
term is the thing I want to focus on the most, along with a selection 
process that doesn't privilege any one body or any one actor or any 
one corrupt force, but basically uses pluralism to direct the corruption 
114. See, e.g., 0. Kay Henderson, Hatch Says Branstad Will Use 'Bully Pulpit' to 
Push for Same-Sex Marriage Ban, RADIO lowA (Sept. 22, 2014), http:// 
www.radioiowa.com/2014/09/22/hatch-says-branstad-will-use-bully-pulpit-to-push­
for-same-sex-marriage-ban/ (reporting on statements by Iowa's Governor Branstad re­
garding the potential passage of a same-sex marriage ban within the state). 
115. See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996). 
116. See Colman McCarthy, Injustice Claims a Tennessee Judge, WASH. PosT (Nov. 
26, 1996), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1996/11 /26/injustice­
claims-a-tennessee-judge/f0a28c33-fcbl-4c l b-947 l-2d5704d56a88/. 
117. See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done 
amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Justices from Office for Unpopular Deci­
sions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 308, 310 (1997) (quoting then-Governor Sundquist as re­
sponding to Penny White's defeat: "Should a judge look over his shoulder [when 
making decisions] about whether they're going to be thrown out of office? I hope 
so."). 
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forces against each other. That way these forces all check the worst of 
the candidates, so they're left with perhaps more mediocre but less 
corrupt judges-or, ideally, better judges who through their merit rise 
above the special interests because everyone can agree that if they 
can't get their crony, they'll at least say that this person is the best 
candidate out there because they're the best at the rule of law, and we 
can at least trust that even if we haven't grabbed them with our dol­
lars. So I think we need to think about this in a more complicated way 
than simply "elections are bad." 
Rex R. Perschbacher: 
Can I just add one thing: there are a couple of notable examples 
where federal judges who are not subject to retention elections have 
been picked on. Constance Baker Motley, a long time ago here in New 
York, was picked on as well. "She's a woman, she's black, she hates 
whites."118 She says, I'm either going to be black or white, I'm either 
going to be a man or a woman119-but maybe it's not that simple 
today. In California recently with the same-sex marriage cases, 
Vaughn Walker, a federal district judge who was widely accepted as 
probably gay, 120 voted to strike down the laws restricting marriage to 
between a man and a woman. 121 He was then immediately accused of, 
and there was a whole hearing on, his bias-about whether he was just 
doing this for personal gain, because then he could get married to his 
long-time lover. 122 That was rejected, but these accusations are made. 
118. See generally Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. I, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975) (denying a motion for recusal based in part on the argument that the judge 
would be influenced in her decision by a personal identification with a black female 
plaintiff); Amber Fricke & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Do Female "Firsts" Still Mat­
ter? Why They Do for Female Judges of Color, 2012 M1cH. ST. L. REv. 1529, 1544 
(noting "the commonly held misperception that women of color cannot be neutral 
arbiters," and observing that some women of color have "face[d] requests for recusal 
from a discrimination lawsuit on the ground that they may identify with those who 
have suffered from race and/or sex discrimination"); Martha Minow, Stripped Down 
Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Ju­
rors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1201, 1207-08 (1992) (elaborating on the implica­
tions of the controversy involving Judge Motley). 
119. Blank, 418 F. Supp. at 4-5. 
120. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Court Reporter: Judge's Gay-Marriage Ruling Now Em­
braced, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Feb. 21, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
washwire/2014/02/21 /court-reporter-judges-gay-marriage-ruling-now-embraced/ (ob­
serving that "[a]lthough it's now known that Judge Walker himself is gay, few would 
have expected his role in marriage law" at the time he was first appointed to the 
federal bench). 
121. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
122. See Maura Dolan, Gay Judge Wasn't Required to Remove Himself from Same­
Sex Marriage Case, U.S. Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://articles.la 
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So I do sympathize with judges. You make one-just one-mistake, 
that's all it will take, and you could be booted off the bench in an 
election. I kind of like the non-election long-term situation. 
Jed Shugerman: 
Other questions? 
Question from Hugh Campbell to the Panelists 
Hugh Campbell: 
My name is Hugh Campbell, I'm not an attorney so forgive me if 
I use the wrong terms. All the panels seem to bring up money at some 
point, and in many cases dark money, and the desire perhaps by the 
ABA and especially some of the judiciary committees of the ABA to 
have more disclosure. Have these committees weighed in with the 
SEC on putting on the calendar, about public companies making dis­
closure? And if they haven't, should they? 
Jed Shugerman: 
I might just invoke that the panel's title is "Beyond the Bank," 
and so it's beyond the jurisdiction of this panel to talk about the SEC 
and banking policy. Is that fair? 
Rex R. Perschbacher: 
The ABA for a long time had a bunch of rules about economics. 
Money is actually easier to deal with than all the things we've been 
talking about here, as I think my co-panelists here were saying, be­
cause the ABA had a set of rules, where if you have any economic 
interest in a case you couldn't sit on the case. 123 Those have been cut 
back a little bit now, but I think money turns out to be a simple thing. 
The kinds of bias we are talking about are really difficult. 
Question from an Audience Member to the Panelists 
Audience Member: 
We have judges and we have people who know they are fair­
minded, really know it. And then we have people who are fair­
minded, but will say, "I think I can sit in this case, but I can under­
stand if somebody else reasonably doesn't think so." Now, you talked 
times.com/20 l l/jun/15/Jocal/la-me-0615-gay-judge-20110616 (describing the recusal 
hearing and decision). 
123. See MODEL CoDE OF Jumc1AL CONDUCT r. 2.11(3) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2011). 
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about the subconscious. I'd like to suggest that the recusal does tend to 
surface things from the subconscious, or at least you use words to 
address them. But what do we know about that particular tum of mind 
that will see the other side and act upon it with a kind of understand­
ing of the reasonable layman's view of the case? 
Debra Lyn Bassett: 
In terms of where that line is between somebody who says, "I'm 
not biased," but maybe they really are biased, versus someone who 
says, ''I'm not biased, I know I'm not biased, but I do understand 
where the perception might come from"? 
Audience Member: 
How do some people get that way and other people don't? And 
do you train for that? 
Debra Lyn Bassett: 
I actually do think that, in part, that's a piece of what these cur­
rent programs are trying to do through educating judges-sitting 
judges-to understand this phenomenon of unconscious bias so they 
can get to the point where they can see "oh!" And the program, al­
though it invokes the Implicit Association Test so they can see some 
of their own reactions, is also generally reminding people about diver­
sity and other kinds of matters. 124 This helps them see more readily 
where perceptions can differ, and where-even though they may be­
lieve down deep in their hearts that they're not biased at all, or that if 
they have some biases that they can nevertheless rise above those bi­
ases and act fairly-the educational component is trying to help them 
see that sometimes those perceptions can exist nonetheless. So I think 
that's about the best answer I have, maybe Gregory has a better one 
than that. 
124. See, e.g., Casey et al., supra note 20, at 6; see also Helping Courts Address 
Implicit Bias: Resources for Education, NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTs., http:// 
www.ncsc.org/ibeducation (last visited Sept. l, 2015) (providing links to articles and 
resources on implicit bias); Implicit Bias Initiative, A.B.A. SEC. LmG., http:// 
www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias.html (last 
visited Sept. l, 2015) (providing links to three videos developed by the Education 
Division of the Administrative Office of the Courts for California that "review[ ] the 
science of implicit bias and offer[ ] suggestions for approaching this issue"). 
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Gregory S. Parks: 
No, I would concur with that. I think for individuals, judges, be­
ing scientifically sophisticated helps them make that judgment. And 
the question is: how many state courts are actually doing this kind of 
training? Not a lot. I know that, I clerked on the Fourth Circuit, and 
my judge, Andre Davis, participated in Duke's L.L.M. program for 
judges about empiricism and law. I don't know if my judge finished 
his thesis yet, but I think judges who are willing to take this informa­
tion in and not resist it are probably more inclined to make good judg­
ments about their own bias. What's troublesome are the judges who 
believe that they are not biased, that no one can tell them they're bi­
ased, whether at the explicit or implicit level across any range of cate­
gories-yes, hardheaded ones. 
Question from an Audience Member to the Panelists 
Audience Member: 
I'd like to push a little bit harder on this thought that recusal 
could function in response to gender or racial bias. So one thought 
about recusal is that that judge is qualified to be a judge and can sit as 
a judge on cases, but just not this particular case. And if you had 
enough information to demonstrate that because of gender or racial 
bias that judge should not sit on that case, aren't you really saying that 
judge should not be a judge at all? 
Debra Lyn Bassett: 
I think that what's going on with the programs that the ABA is 
doing is just making them think about whether this could be a factor. I 
don't think they're trying to come out and say, "You are a racist, you 
are a sexist, you are an ageist, you are somebody who discriminates 
always on the basis of disability." I think what they are trying to do is 
just educate the judges that these biases do exist, that these are within 
ourselves, and that by virtue of reminding ourselves-judges in partic­
ular, but all of us-if we all remind ourselves that most of us do har­
bor these biases, and if we make ourselves more aware of that on a 
regular basis, that can help-not eliminate, but help-to mitigate that 
bias. And if indeed someone has risen to the level where they are not 
just having some of these unconscious biases but they are actually 
actively racist or sexist or whatever, then, of course, arguably that per­
son shouldn't be a sitting judge. But that's not what this educational 
program is about. What this educational program is about is heighten­
ing awareness, so you will not so blindly walk into situations. You 
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won't just assume, "Well, hey, I'm educated, so therefore how can I 
possibly harbor any racist or sexist or other kinds of biases." It's an 
increased self-awareness, that's what it's about. 
Gregory S. Parks: 
I would concur with that. I make a sharp distinction between be­
ing a racist and having implicit racial biases. Racist is a very high 
standard. You use the "N-word" frequently, well this gets compli­
cated, and you're not an African American around other African 
Americans, but you use it as an epithet and you explicitly despise Af­
rican Americans. You're a member of the Ku Klux Klan. You're a 
racist, right? The challenge with implicit bias is that, especially around 
issues of race, so many people have them. Like the numbers I gave, 
seventy-five to ninety percent of whites, approximately sixty percent 
of Latino and Asian Americans, and thirty to sixty-five percent of Af­
rican Americans suggest that it is in the ether, that it is in the environ­
ment that we all take in; and so to say that a judge cannot be a judge 
because they have implicit racial or gender or sexual orientation biases 
would mean we probably wouldn't have judges. And so, the question 
is, what do we do then, once we know that so many people have im­
plicit or automatic biases? To my co-panelist's point, we try to edu­
cate them. We hope for the best. We hope that they are actually 
interested in not being biased, that they will want to continue to do 
things that will militate against their automatic associations with racial 
categories, gender, sexual orientation, and positively and negatively 
valenced concepts and words. So, that's my point. I think you have to 
make a sharp distinction between a sexist, a racist, a homophobe, and 
someone who simply has an automatic preference or bias. 
Question from an Audience Member to the Panelists 
Audience Member: 
Thank you, I just had a quick question. There is one type of bias 
that I don't think anyone has really touched upon, but I'd just be curi­
ous as to the panel's views on this. It's a simpie fact-I guess for lack 
of a better word I'd call it professional bias-the fact that unlike in 
some countries where judges are trained from law school or shortly 
thereafter to become judges and to think (hopefully) as impartially as 
possible, the judges here, whether appointed or elected, all come for 
the most part from a professional background and they bring their per­
sonal experience, whether it's from the plaintiffs' bar or the prosecu­
tor's office or otherwise. Obviously, having been an advocate for 
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many years, it's not a bad thing necessarily to have a bias in that 
context, but how do you tum the switch off? I was curious to see 
whether anyone has empirically measured the effect of those types of 
very obvious professional biases on the way cases get decided, be­
cause I would think it's probably one of the first things that people 
look at when they're doing research on a particular judge: what's their 
background? Where do they come from? What's their point of view? 
Dmitry Bam: 
Yeah, there was that-I forget the author now, somebody will 
probably remember it, there was a great book that came out just a 
couple years ago called The Judge-Lawyer Bias, which looks at how 
judges make decisions that are sort of in favor of the legal profes­
sion.125 They try to make laws more complicated, try to make lives 
better for lawyers. 126 I can't remember the author, but it's a great book 
and he's done a lot of sort of empirical work. There are other kinds of 
biases that stem from that, as well. I mentioned friendships, right? I 
mean, that's what happens when you have judges who come from the 
ranks of lawyers, who were partners in the same firm. You can have a 
lot more friendships, and you have to try to figure out how you're 
going to deal with those kinds of biases that really result from the fact 
that judges didn't go to special judge school with their own little com­
munity like is common in Europe, but really are just lawyers at heart. 
Gregory S. Parks: 
Following up on what we've been talking about, which is educat­
ing judges: so, implicit racial or gender bias is only one kind or two 
kinds of cognitive biases that are out there. There are dozens of differ­
ent types of cognitive biases. And so I know my mentor at Cornell, 
Jeff Rachlinski, when he travels around the country and goes to judi­
cial conferences, he actually collects data and he gives a presenta­
tion-so the judges get some benefit, and he gets a publication-and 
what he does is he tries to educate them about cognitive biases that are 
much broader than simple implicit racial, gender, and sexual-orienta­
tion biases.127 The Wistrich article that I just mentioned with Chris 
125. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 23 (2010). 
126. Id. 
127. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Heuristics 
and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges, 163 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL EcoN. 167 
(2007); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bank­
ruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guth-
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Guthrie, Dean of Vanderbilt Law School, and Jeff Rachlinski, who's 
at Cornell Law School, is simply focused on anchoring-how large 
numbers and small numbers sort of orient a person as to what kind of 
settlement figure they would come up with or damages award they 
would come up with. 128 So I know that there are individuals out there 
who are actually trying to train judges around broader notions of what 
cognitive biases are, and maybe how to address them, but I'm not sure 
if they focus on the specific one that you talk about. 
Jed Shugerman: 
One point to add is that I was making an argument for merit 
selection earlier, but one of the big downsides of merit selection is that 
a big player in that process is the state bar association. So we're talk­
ing about replicating the profession-in fact, you're giving them a 
seat at the table to pick who gets sent to the governor on that list of 
three. So here are a couple more layers to that. First of all, it turns out 
when they did studies of Missouri-of what is often called the Mis­
souri Plan, because they are one of the innovators of it129-studies 
showed that it was equally balanced between the plaintiffs' bar, the 
big plaintiffs' bar, and the big defense bar, but there were no labor 
lawyers who got appointed and, surprisingly, no criminal defense law­
yers. They're out no matter what with this process we have in 
America. So that's one angle. The other problem with merit selection, 
at least in the past, is that we're talking about how to counteract im­
plicit bias. Studies in the '70s and '80s found that these merit selection 
systems produce more white men for the bench, whereas the parties­
whether Democrat or Republican-were more likely to nominate fe­
male and racial-minority candidates, in part because they were more 
accountable to the broader public whereas the bar still was largely run 
by white men. 130 Query whether this has changed a bit as the bar has 
changed in the twenty-first century, but it certainly seems to lag be­
hind society, so that's certainly in my mind a mark against the merit 
system despite its other advantages. 
rie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The 
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251 (2005). 
128. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
129. See MAUREEN O'CONNOR, Omo COURTS 2013: A PROPOSAL FOR STRENGTHEN­
ING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1, 3 (2013), http://ohiojudicialreform.org/wp-content/re­
sources/Plan 13.pdf. 
130. See, e.g., Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Diversity in State and Fed­
eral Appellate Courts: Change and Continuity Across 20 Years, 29 JusT. Svs. J. 47, 
51-54 (2008) (comparing diversity on the bench between the years 1985 and 2005). 
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Question from Leonard Horowitz to the Panelists 
Leonard Horowitz: 
Thank you. My name is Leonard Horowitz. I have a broad ques­
tion for you. It seems to me that impartiality and the appearance of 
impartiality are a bedrock of democracy, and we're having now-and 
it's probably happened for a long time, but I think it's more apparent 
now than maybe ever before-we're seeing important decisions come 
with political bias. Cases, especially in the health care act cases and 
the voter ID cases, are being decided on strictly political lines, which 
seems to me to be a very dangerous trend, and potentially taking away 
confidence in the judicial system. I would wonder if you would com­
ment on that, please. 
Rex R. Perschbacher: 
I don't have a helpful comment-I think that's true! Personally, 
anyway. Yes, our society is becoming much more politicized in every 
sort of way. We used to just worry about lawyers getting into every­
thing, but now it's politicians, I guess, getting into everything. And I 
don't think there's a darn thing we can do about it from the bias point 
of view. 
Dmitry Bam: 
Yeah, part of the question is: we can describe lots of things as 
biases, but it's very hard to define what exactly we want to get rid of, 
so what is impartiality, right? I think we've sort of accepted the fact 
that partisan preferences, political preferences, play an important role 
in judges' decisions. We've known this for a long time but pretended 
for a long time that it wasn't the case-but we've known for a long 
time now that judges' backgrounds and their political preferences 
shape how they view the world, and I think we've just come to the 
conclusion that that's not the kind of impartiality that we demand. In 
the Republican Party of Minnesota v. White case that we've talked 
about a couple of times, the court grapples with defining impartial­
ity .131 And one of the definitions that Justice Scalia rejects is complete 
open-mindedness-sort of a clean slate, "I'm accepting every argu­
ment"-and he says we don't want that kind of impartiality. 132 We 
select judges based on their views. We want them to be educated, 
having made up their minds on certain issues, and just because I, Jus­
131. 536 U.S. 765, 775-79 (2002). 
132. Id. at 778. 
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tice Scalia, have made up my mind on abortion and you've seen that 
view in my decisions, that doesn't mean I'm not impartial. I'm still 
impartial; I just have a legal view that has shaped my political and 
partisan preferences. 
Question from Susan Lerner 
Susan Lerner: 
I think it's interesting-I'm Susan Lerner by the way-to look at 
the trial-court level in Los Angeles over a period of time, starting with 
Jerry Brown in his first incarnation and going all the way through to 
now. There's a tremendous transition in terms of the sorts of people 
appointed or elected. Los Angeles for the trial court, and California in 
general, have the mixed system: it's appointed, judges are appointed 
not from a panel, just generally-unless there has been no appoint­
ment when the election comes up for that particular seat, in which case 
it becomes an open seat and anybody can run. 133 And my friends who 
are judges in Los Angeles pointed out that a big emphasis in the past 
twenty years is prosecutors are appointed to the bench there, and in 
fact when you interview them for evaluations and you say, "Why do 
you want to go on the bench?" some of them actually say, "well, it's 
the next step in my career! I've done what I can in the DA's office." 
So you get that bias, but the election then ends up being a break from 
that process because people who have different backgrounds are able 
to run. So it isn't always the case that elections work in a negative 
way. But just in response to your comments about Scalia's comments 
and the biases, and I'm forgetting the Ninth Circuit conservative judge 
who wrote a beautiful book almost ten years ago now where he said 
that the most important quality of a judge is the ability to continue to 
learn and grow on the bench. And don't we have a problem with some 
of the judges who have been appointed-particularly, from my bias, 
that come through the Federalist Society who have their formed opin­
ions, and are not listening to the litigants and who are not learning and 
growing on the bench but rather putting everything into the box that 
they came with, and isn't that a problem? 
Jed Shugerman: 
On this question, Linda Greenhouse just wrote a piece yesterday 
called Law in the Raw, and the point was that we've reached a new era 
133. See Methods of Selection: California, NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http:// 
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_ofjudges.cfm?state= 
CA (last visited Sept. l, 2015). 
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where judges are just politicians in robes. 134 And my reaction is, wel­
come to the party, Linda! I mean, just look at American history. They 
were literally politicians in robes throughout the entire nineteenth cen­
tury. They were actually running from the bench; during Lincoln's 
presidency and right after, Lincoln's appointees were all people who 
had political ambition-this is sort of the book A Team of Rivals, that 
shows that many of these appointments were specifically because they 
were rivals to Lincoln and he kept his coalition together, and many of 
them harbored presidential ambitions from the bench. 135 Charles Ev­
ans Hughes resigned from the Supreme Court to run for President. 136 
And so they were deeply political in the nineteenth century, and 
deeply biased in the nineteenth century obviously as well. The Su­
preme Court was attacked for being political through the Lochner era, 
and through the New Deal era, and it was always on the conservative 
end until it was deeply political on the left for about fifteen years. I 
liked those decisions in general, but they were political. Earl Warren 
was a politician who only got on the Supreme Court because he was a 
successful politician and because he had been a challenger in 1952 for 
the Republican nomination. 137 So it's a proud tradition in America, 
unlike in other countries, to appoint politicians to the bench. So 
whether we have elected judges formally, or politicians appointed, it's 
deeply in the American judicial fabric. 
Okay, so that sounds negative. Rex talked about European judges 
and why they don't talk about the appearance of bias as much-it's 
because they're bureaucratic functionaries. Do we want the European 
system, where if you get the right grades coming out of a European 
law school, you're selected to go from college right into judge school 
without doing anything else with your life, and then you're literally a 
self-promoter?138 Academics do that too, right? But European judges 
work their way up; they promote themselves without ever meeting a 
non-judge or non-lawyer. And so Europeans haven't exactly gotten 
the right balance, either, but somewhere between the two may be a 
better mean. 
134. See Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Law in the Raw, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.corn/2014/11/13/opinion/law-in-the-raw .html. 
135. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE PounCAL GENIUS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, at xvi (2005). 
136. See, e.g., Jill Lepore, Benched, NEw YORKER (June 18, 2012), http:// 
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/06/18/benched. 
137. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL 
HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992). 
138. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 1, at 5. 
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Question from an Audience Member to the Panelists 
Audience Member: 
Yes, I think that two barriers to exposing judges' biases are, num­
ber one, the judges' ability to alter transcripts of the hearings, and 
secondly, closed courtrooms. Although in New York it's supposed to 
be open courtrooms, that's not the case all the time in Queens family 
courts, and I think those are two barriers. 
Dmitry Barn: 
On the second piece I just want to say that I agree that more 
openness is part of the answer, more exposure to the public. Jocelyn 
Simonson, who I think is here, who is, I think, a fellow at NYU right 
now, wrote a great piece that recently came out about having the pub­
lic-courtroom visitors, participants-being able to be more exposed 
to what's going on as sort of a check on judges. 139 That's part of the 
answer, and part of what I've been thinking about is how you get the 
public more involved and educated about what it is that judges are 
actually doing, and not being able to sort of hide it behind a cloak. 
Question from an Audience Member to the Panelists 
Audience Member: 
I wanted to follow up on White, and whether there have been any 
studies relating to this as it applies to judges. I think there have been 
some as it applies generally, but psychologically, once a person an­
nounces some type of position, even if they don't commit to it, which 
is sort of that line in White, have there been studies that say it's more 
difficult for the individual to change or be open-minded? Has any of 
that been done in terms of judges who have announced something in a 
campaign and then been confronted with a similar case and then 
stayed "in the box," as the commenter over there said? Has White 
created a whole new set of biases that didn't exist because now, once 
you've announced, you're on the record and you can't then be more 
open-minded? Are there any studies, anything you can speak to on 
that? 
Dmitry Barn: 
Well, I don't know if there were studies done with judges-I 
mean, there's lots of social science that looks at making previous com­
139. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014). 
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mitments or being stuck to those views, so that has been done; but I 
haven't seen a study that's been done with judges on that. But of 
course, the majority in that case actually rejects that reasoning. The 
majority says, "Look, we as judges, sometimes we've committed our­
selves in previous opinions, sometimes committed ourselves in books 
that we've written as academics." So Justice Scalia, in the majority, 
says, "It doesn't really matter. Just because we've announced our 
views on something, that doesn't mean we're biased, even if it sort of 
suggests that that's what we believe."140 
Audience Member: 
But is there a difference between doing that publicly on the cam­
paign trail versus in an opinion or in a law review article? 
Dmitry Barn: 
I would think so. And I think Justice Stevens or Ginsburg in dis­
sent says that there is a difference, and in fact, if you look at federal 
nomination hearings, there's a reason why we don't say anything, 
right? We don't say anything useful because we're worried about how 
that would look, but now we're letting judges do it in the course of 
their campaigns. 141 And what that really means, when you let them do 
that, is you make them do it because they're competing against others 
who are doing it, or you've got questionnaires coming to judges and 
they say "What are your views?" and you have to answer them, so I 
think you're right that there is a difference, but the Court rejects it. 
Jed Shugerman: 
I mean, this is part of the point in White. Both Kennedy and 
O'Connor say that if a state chooses judicial elections, you're going to 
have people campaigning in those elections; that's what you get with 
elections. 142 And so the downside is, people make these campaign 
statements, and some would say about democracy that you actually 
hope that people would actually have some stickiness to the things that 
140. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777 (2002) ("A judge's 
lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been 
thought a necessary component of equal justice, and with good reason."). 
141. Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Thus, the rationale underlying uncon­
strained speech in elections for political office-that representative government de­
pends on the public's ability to choose agents who will act at its behest-does not 
carry over to campaigns for the bench."). 
142. See id. at 789 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Moreover, contested elections gen­
erally entail campaigning."). 
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they say on the campaign trail that anchor them in. I think that's wise; 
I think if it's uncomfortable for judges to be making promises or to be 
making campaign statements or to be asking directly for money, there 
is a plausible view that says, "That's what comes with elections, so if 
you don't like it, then let's see elections in full, and then the public 
can either take them or reject them based upon what their benefits 
are." 
Audience Member: 
So are judicial elections unconstitutional? 
Dmitry Bam: 
Some have argued that. 143 
Jed Shugerman: 
I think the point about federalism is to say that the public should 
at least be able to see them in one way or the other and then make that 
choice. 
143. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Indepen­
dence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 498 (1986) 
(observing that "the use of non-tenured state judges seems to be a clear violation of 
procedural due process" in at least some cases). 
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CLOSING REMARKS 
Dean Trevor Morrison* 
INTRODUCTION BY ALESSANDRA BANIEL-STARK 
So we have just one last speaker today who needs very little in­
troduction, but I'm going to give an introduction anyway. He's cur­
rently the Dean of the Law School here at NYU, where-in addition 
to captaining the ship-he teaches constitutional law and other sub­
jects. And I actually learned yesterday that he was the professor of one 
of our panelists when he was at Cornell as well, so we're pleased to 
play a part in this sort of intellectual family moment. So we're very 
honored to have Dean Morrison here to make some closing remarks. 
REMARKS BY DEAN TREVOR MORRISON 
Hi everybody. Thanks for being here. I just have a few quick 
remarks by way of closing. This is one of those days when I'm both 
thrilled and a little bit unhappy about being Dean, and for essentially 
the same reason. I'm thrilled to be part of a school that puts together 
events like this that bring together our terrific journals like the Journal 
ofLegislation and Public Policy and the Brennan Center and the ABA 
Center for Professional Responsibility. Collaborations like this, that 
involve our students, our great research centers, and leaders of the 
profession, is what this school does so regularly and it's part of what 
makes this an exciting place. Sad, because the Dean's job prohibited 
me from actually being here to enjoy all of this, but I'm sure it's been 
a terrific day. 
This issue of judicial bias and recusal is of deep importance, as 
you all know, and it's in many ways surprising how unstable the posi­
tions are on this issue given how old a democracy we are-so that, if 
nothing else, certainly underscores the importance of today's sympo­
sium. So thank you to the Journal for bringing it together, and to all of 
you for being part of it. Thank you to the speakers, including my for­
mer student, for being here, and again, I'm just thrilled that we were 
able to put on an event like this today. Thank you all. 
* Trevor Morisson, Dean and Eric M. and Laurie B. Roth Professor of Law, NYU 
School of Law. 
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